Quantum cryptography protocols robust against photon number splitting attacks for weak laser pulse implementations.
@article{Scarani2002QuantumCP,
title={Quantum cryptography protocols robust against photon number splitting attacks for weak laser pulse implementations.},
author={Valerio Scarani and Antonio Ac{\'i}n and Gregoire Ribordy and Nicolas Gisin},
journal={Physical review letters},
year={2002},
volume={92 5},
pages={
057901
}
}We introduce a new class of quantum key distribution protocols, tailored to be robust against photon number splitting (PNS) attacks. We study one of these protocols, which differs from the original protocol by Bennett and Brassard (BB84) only in the classical sifting procedure. This protocol is provably better than BB84 against PNS attacks at zero error.
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- Throughout our analysis, we suppose that Eve cannot modify the detection probability of Bob. If Eve has an access to Alice's and Bob's labs, she could as well read the data on their computers
